Spillover Asymmetry and Why It Matters

While spillovers are a crucial factor in determining the optimal environment for innovation, there is no consensus regarding their impact on firm behavior. One reason for this may be that models differ in their assumptions for the functional form of the spillover pool. In industrial organization and economic geography, for example, the predominant convention is that all innovation within an industry/region contributes to a spillover pool that has a common value for all firms. An alternative convention prevalent in endogenous growth and evolutionary economics is that spillovers have directionality-the size of the relevant pool differs across firms. We believe that knowing the correct functional form may facilitate theoretical consensus-either analytically (by modifying models' assumptions) or empirically (by supporting a critical test of competing theories). We characterize and test the functional form of spillover pools across fifty markets in the banking industry. Our results for firm efficiency improvement in that setting are consistent with expectations for asymmetric spillovers and inconsistent with expectations for pooled spillovers.
Introduction
Spillovers (the leakage of knowledge across firms) are one of the central constructs in the economics of innovation. Romer (1986) relies on spillovers to explain increasing economy-wide returns to innovation in the presence of decreasing firm-specific returns to innovation. Spillovers have two effects on aggregate innovation (Spence 1984) , an efficiency effect and an incentive effect. The efficiency effect is that spillovers reduce the expenditures necessary for firms to achieve a given level of innovation. The incentive effect is that imitation by rivals reduces the potential returns to innovation and therefore the incentives to innovate. Accordingly spillovers are a crucial factor in determining the optimal environment for innovation.
Two conventions have developed around the directionality of spillovers. One convention, prevalent in industrial organization (Griliches 1979 , Levin & Reiss 1984 , Spence 1984 , Jaffe 1988 , Adams and Jaffe 1996 and economic geography (Ellison and Glaeser 1997, Black and Henderson 1999) is that spillovers are non-directional (pooled). All innovation in an industry/region contributes to a spillover pool that has a common value for all firms. Firms may differ in their access to the pool (if, for example, they are geographically distant), or the relevance of the pool (if, for example, they use chemistry as their basic science while other firms use biology). However, if the pool is proximate and relevant to all firms, then they draw equal benefit from the contributions of all other firms. In other words, there is no sense of a leader/follower relationship for spillovers as there is for the flow of knowledge in the diffusion and imitation literatures.
An alternative convention prevalent in the endogenous growth literature (Jovanovic and Rob 1989 , Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994 , Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2002 ) is that spillovers have directionality. This view preserves the notion of an innovator and an imitator inherent in the diffusion literature (Mansfield 1968) , the evolutionary economics literature Winter 1982, Klepper 1996) , and the international trade literature (Krugman 1979 , Abramovitz 1986 , Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff 1989 , Grossman and Helpman 1992 . Under this view some firms/nations have superior knowledge relative to other firms, and knowledge flows exclusively from those with superior knowledge to those with inferior knowledge.
Thus despite the fact that spillovers are central to models of innovation/growth across all these literatures, there is no consensus on their functional form. Correspondingly there is no consensus regarding their impact on firms' innovative behavior. Predictions are that they increase (Ellison and Glaeser 1997 , Black and Henderson 1999 , Jovanovic and Rob 1989 , Grossman and Helpman 1992 , decrease (Spence 1984 , Levin and Reiss 1988 , Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2002 , decrease then increase (Nelson and Winter 1982) , and increase then decrease (Aghion et al. 2001 ) innovation/growth.
While it is possible to resolve the controversy via empiricism, the empirical record is similarly equivocal. Studies of spillovers consistently indicate that R&D intensity and outcomes increase with the size of the spillover pool (Jaffe 1986 (Jaffe , 1988 . However the studies exhibit an apparent anomaly where the output elasticity of spillovers is comparable to and sometimes greater than that for the firm's own R&D (Jaffe 1986, Adams and Jaffe 1996) . Given the spillover pool in these studies is on average n-1 times the firm's own R&D, where n is the number of firms in the industry, the economic contribution of spillovers is sometimes orders of magnitude greater than that from the firm's own R&D spending. If this were true, few firms could justify R&D investment.
One explanation for the empirical anomaly may be that spillovers are capturing market size effects, as suggested by Levin (1988) . An alternative explanation for the anomaly is that the large coefficients on spillovers reflect estimation bias from using a pooled spillover specification when in fact spillovers are asymmetric (see derivation in Appendix 1).
Accordingly, knowing the correct functional form for spillovers has the potential to resolve empirical anomalies and thereby illuminate theory regarding their behavioral impact. The goal of this paper is facilitating consensus in innovation theory by clarifying and testing the functional form of spillovers. To our knowledge no empirical test of spillovers' functional form exists. Arrow (1962) posed the problem of appropriability and innovation, and the tension between incentives to innovate and the diffusion of the benefits. The central concern is that since knowledge is a public good (non-rival and non-excludable), the best means to appropriate the returns from innovation is for a monopolist to keep the knowledge in house. However this is inefficient from a social standpoint since the knowledge isn't fully exploited. It also may be privately inefficient since a firm other than the inventing firm may be able to use the knowledge more effectively.
Background on Spillovers
There are four operative uses of the term spillovers in the literature: the general phenomenon of leakage, the amount of knowledge available to rival firms (the pool), the percentage that leaks, and the elasticity of rival knowledge to own output. We clarify these distinctions using the Levin and Reiss expression for the contribution of rival R&D to focal firm innovative output, Y i :
where:
is focal firm R&D α is the elasticity of own R&D to output S i is the pool of rival knowledge the focal firm draws upon ω is the extent of knowledge leakage between rivals γ is the elasticity of rival knowledge to output
Here forward we use the term spillovers to refer to the general phenomenon, the term spillover pool for the expression S i , the term leakage rate for the expression ω, and expropriability for the expression γ. Thus the value of spillovers may differ across firms through differences in their relevant spillover pool, S i. , differences in the ease of gaining access to the pool, ω, and differential effectiveness in utilizing the knowledge that has been accessed, γ. This paper deals exclusively with asymmetry in the functional form of the spillover pool, S i. .
Equation 1 illustrated one source of confusion regarding the phrase "spillovers." In addition to this theoretical confusion is some empirical confusion in that spillovers are often defined by how they are measured empirically. This is problematic given our goals. Much of the empirical treatment of spillovers inherently assumes directionality in that it examines particular transfers of knowledge. For example, studies using patent citations to study spillovers trace the source and destination of knowledge (e.g., Thompson 2006) . Studies examining the actual mechanisms of transfer such as alliances and labor mobility often refer to the transfer as spillovers (e.g., Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003) . This empirical approach is attractive because it allows researchers to demonstrate that particular innovations have indeed transferred.
There are two concerns with the approach, however. First, these point-to-point transfers of knowledge are only subsets of the theoretical definition of spillovers. As equation 1 illustrates the theoretical concept is much broader. Spence (1984) , for example, examines simultaneous R&D by all firms in the industry whose cost is reduced by the total spillovers being generated by the set of firms engaged in R&D. Thus there is no "innovation" that gets transferred. Second, the ability to identify a source and destination presupposes directionality, while our goal is to determine if spillovers are better characterized as being directional or pooled.
Because we want to determine which theories correctly model spillovers, we adopt the broad definition of spillovers implied by equation 1: knowledge generated outside the firm exploited to generate either new products (increase demand) or new processes (decrease cost). Thus our definition includes point-to-point transfers and imitation, but is not restricted to them. Rather we test where a firm's extramural knowledge appears to originate (from the set of all firms in the market or the set of firms with superior knowledge).
What do we mean by spillover pools?
There are two basic conventions in modeling the spillover pool, S i . The first convention, shared by industrial organization and economic geography, is to treat all economic activity as contributing to a pool that is equally accessible/valuable to all firms. We refer to this convention as pooled spillovers. The second convention assumes that economic actors differ in their level of knowledge and that knowledge flows exclusively from those with more knowledge to those with less knowledge. This convention is shared by evolutionary economics, endogenous growth, and trade theories.
The lack of consensus may reflect fundamental differences in beliefs; however it is possible that it reflects simple measurement problems -researchers can't identify knowledge sets. This means that modelers and empiricists must make simplifying assumptions about differences in knowledge sets. Thus the argument of functional form may be largely one of the better simplifying assumption.
Perhaps the best means to make this argument is by fictitious example. The radar diagram in Figure 1 is intended to capture all available knowledge. At any given time there is a knowledge frontier defined by the perimeter of the union of all knowledge sets. The example depicts a universe of two firms.
In general, the knowledge frontier is defined by Firm 1's knowledge set. However, Firm 2 has greater knowledge in political science, sociology, and classical studies. Thus while knowledge flows predominately from Firm 1 to Firm 2, in these three domains it is possible for knowledge to flow from Firm 2 to Firm 1.
Probably everyone would agree that if you could actually construct this map, then a firm's spillover pool would be defined as the complement of its knowledge within the current frontier. The practical problem isn't as simple as the example, however. We can't characterize the knowledge set for each firm. Even if we could, the computational task of pair-wise comparing all knowledge sets in an industry would be overwhelming. The practical problem of spillover pools then is one of choosing the best simplifying assumption. Are we as researchers better off ignoring redundant knowledge, or are we better off ignoring the superior knowledge of a firm who in general has less knowledge. The pooling convention corresponds to Figure 2a -it assumes that knowledge is largely unique and therefore the tolerated error is the redundant area (that shaded). In contrast the asymmetry assumption corresponds to Figure 2b -it assumes that knowledge is largely redundant and therefore the tolerated error (the shaded area) is the knowledge unique to firm 2.
Is knowledge redundant?
One way to choose the better simplifying assumption is to gauge the extent to which knowledge is redundant. We tackle this by examining the patent record. We consider the relationship between R&D spending and patenting in the chemical industry (ISIC 2400). We limit the analysis to one industry because we need a setting where patenting is a good proxy for knowledge amounts and types. Of the three industries where we expected this to hold (chemicals, medical products, electronic components), chemicals was the industry where firms were most likely to have at least one patent (35%), and where the number of patents was most closely correlated with R&D (R 2 = 0.79). 1995 and 1999 in a given patent class. While there are exceptions, the figure tends to suggest that firms doing R&D are engaged in subsets of the activity of those doing more R&D. This implies the assumption of redundancy is plausible. The redundancy assumption is reinforced by the observation that most firms (65%) do no patenting. Given the high propensity to patent in this industry, we would expect firms to patent if their knowledge were unique and valuable to rivals.
Theoretical differences regarding the impact of spillovers
As mentioned previously subfields differ in their approach to modeling spillover pools. These differences in conventions yield different propositions regarding the impact of spillovers on innovation.
Industrial Organization. IO models tend to examine R&D spending by profit maximizing firms among a set of homogeneous rivals in the presence of spillovers. The pool of spillovers is symmetric across firms (the sum of rival R&D), but conditioned by the percentage of the pool that leaks to rivals.
2 Spence (1984) considers dynamic cost competition among firms who maximize profits by choice of R&D taking rival behavior as given. Because rival R&D substitutes for own R&D, investment decreases in the leakage rate.
2 Note that in duopoly models spillovers are asymmetric in that the R&D of firm A becomes the pool for firm B and vice versa. Levin and Reiss (1984, 1988 ) model a profit maximizing firm choosing levels of R&D, taking into account the elasticity of own investment as well as that from spillovers of rival R&D. As with Spence, firms are identical and the available spillover pool is defined as the sum of all rival R&D adjusted for leakage. What differs from Spence is that own R&D and rival R&D are imperfect substitutes, each with their own elasticity. They reach the same conclusion as Spence that R&D intensity decreases in the leakage rate; however, they show that higher elasticity of rival knowledge increases R&D intensity.
Economic Geography. Economic geography examines geographic concentration of economic activity to understand both the prevalence of agglomeration and its relationship to economic growth. Both are linked to Marshall's (1890) hypothesis that cities offer close contacts that generate local spillovers.
These spillovers include gains from sharing a labor market, from inter-firm trade, and from local knowledge. While there is some acknowledgement that spillovers may be asymmetric, e.g., the benefits of locating near one plant may differ from locating near another (Ellison and Glaeser 1997) , models and empirics tend to adopt a pooled spillover convention. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) model geographic concentration of industries through the lens of firms maximizing profits through choice of plant location. The profits associated with each location comprise a "natural advantage component," e.g., weather/soil in Napa Valley, the effects of spillovers (characterized as profit elasticity on the aggregate activity of existing firms), and an idiosyncratic firm-location specific component. Profits and concentration both increase with aggregate activity and spillover elasticity. Black and Henderson (1999) model the spatial growth of economic activity under exogenous population growth and endogenous economic growth. They develop a two good/two city model where firm output is a function of local sectoral employment, the corresponding level of human capital, and the firm's own human capital. The output elasticities of employment and human capital capture scale economies from the total volume of communication (Romer 1986 ) and knowledge spillovers (Lucas 1988) , respectively. Thus returns to own human capital are increasing in the extent of local human capital.
Cities grow at a rate proportional to human capital accumulation.
Evolutionary economics. Evolutionary economics examines how firm behavior, market structure, and outcomes are jointly determined in models of innovative and imitative activity by profit-maximizing firms competing along a downward-sloping demand curve. A major distinction from IO models is that firms differ in their levels of knowledge, and accordingly their cost functions and profits. Of the evolutionary economics models, only Nelson and Winter (1982) 
The empirical record on spillovers
The lack of theoretical consensus regarding spillovers is matched by an equivocal empirical record. Studies break down into three classes: Those examining the impact of spillover pools on R&D, those examining survey-based measures of learning and imitation, and those examining spillovers and growth. The studies of spillover pools consistently indicate that R&D intensity and outcomes increase with the size of the spillover pool (Jaffe 1986 (Jaffe , 1988 . However the spillover pool as constructed in these studies (sum of R&D spending by firms in the industry) is highly correlated with market size, and thus the spillover coefficient may be capturing market size effects. Moreover the empirical tests examine the impact of pool size, whereas propositions in the models pertain to the behavioral (percentage of pool that leaks) or technological (elasticity of the pool on focal firm output) dimensions of spillovers.
In contrast, the survey-based studies examine the behavioral and technological dimension of spillovers. The behavioral and technological dimensions are captured through questions regarding learning mechanisms and imitation lags. The learning measures are self-reports by R&D managers of the mechanisms that are most effective for learning about technology; the imitation lag measure is a selfreport of the time it takes to imitate a major patented new product invention. Levin, Cohen, and Mowery (1985) find that the imitation lag measure has no significant effect on R&D intensity. Levin (1988) looking at the learning mechanisms finds none of them to be significant in explaining R&D intensity. Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) using new survey data find that R&D intensity increases with the importance of ideas from rivals, but decreases with the importance of information from suppliers and market mediated information from rivals. Finally, Levin and Reiss (1988) identified three survey measures potentially related to the elasticity of spillovers (the importance of rivals to technological progress, the importance of government research to technological progress, and technological maturity).
None of these explained variation in the elasticity of the spillover pool.
In studies of spillovers and growth, Ellison and Glaser (1997) test whether observed levels of industrial localization are different from what would be expected to occur randomly (without agglomeration effects) given the Herfindahl index of industry plant sizes. They find that concentration is non-random, but only slightly so. A coarse decomposition of concentration effects into natural advantages versus spillovers (using decay in elasticity over expanded geographic region) suggests evidence of spillover effects.
While Black and Henderson (1999) don't directly test their conclusion that cities grow at a rate proportional to human capital accumulation, they show it matches the stylized fact that city populations increase in the percentage of the population that is college educated. This lends support to their model of returns to own human capital which are increasing in the extent of local human capital (spillover pool).
While these growth studies provide evidence consistent with local spillover effects, other tests, e.g., Klepper (2002) and Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) , indicate there is no effect of spillovers after controlling for the local origin of firm founders.
In summary, there is no empirical consensus on spillovers with which to illuminate the theoretical schism. One reason for this may be that the empirics capture spillovers as the sum of economic activity (pooled spillovers). Thus the empirical measure differs from at least some of the theories (those which assume asymmetric spillovers). It also may differ from the actual functional form of spillovers.
Accordingly our empirical strategy is to test the functional form of the spillover pool.
Empirical Tests
We test the functional form of the spillover pool by examining firm innovation rates as a function of relative knowledge in a market. To do so we begin by characterizing general functional forms in the literature and then specifying our empirical implementations of those forms.
Functional forms of spillovers
A general functional form for spillovers allows the knowledge for each rival firm j, k j , to leak to focal firm i by a pairwise specific parameter φ ij , such that the total spillovers available to firm i are characterized by:
Note that the general form in equation 2 supports an infinite set of specific functional forms for spillovers. Rather than examine an exhaustive set of possibilities, we restrict attention to those forms currently employed in the innovation literature.
Pooled spillovers. As noted previously the predominant convention in IO and economic geography (both theory and empiricism) treats φ ij = 1 for all i and j, as long as firms i and j are technically and geographically proximate.
Asymmetric spillovers. A broad definition of asymmetric spillovers suggests all matrices where φ ij is not constrained to a single value. However the theoretical presumption that knowledge flows from firms with more knowledge to those with less knowledge sets φ ij = 0 for all rivals whose knowledge is below that of the focal firm:
Empirical implementation of the functional forms
Within the general restriction for asymmetric spillovers in equation 4, the theoretical literature has utilized two specific functional forms: leader-distance from evolutionary economics, and densityabove from endogenous growth. Our empirical implementation of these forms follows theoretical convention (Spence 1984 , Levin and Reiss 1984 , Nelson and Winter 1982 in that we define relative knowledge in terms of firm cost efficiency. Cost efficiency allows us to capture differences in cost for the 5 When firm are not proximate then spillovers decay with geographic and/or technical distance (see, for example, Jaffe 1986 and same quality or differences in quality for the same cost. Following the same convention we measure innovation as cost reduction. 6 Our approach therefore preserves the primary theoretical foundations of spillovers.
The first empirical form, leader-distance, matches the spillover construct in Nelson and Winter (1982) , where firms have likelihood p of imitating last period's best practice (lowest cost function across all rivals). Accordingly, we capture the leader-distance spillover pool as the cost distance between the lowest cost firm and focal firm from the prior period:
A companion measure, laggard-distance, is the difference in cost efficiency between the least efficient firm in a market and the focal firm.
We test how a firm's innovation (cost reduction) is affected by both distance measures. If innovation is driven by spillovers and if spillovers are shared equally across firms (pooled), then we expect distance to be insignificant. If instead innovation is driven by mean reversion, we expect the coefficients on the two measures to be equal but of opposite sign. If, however, innovation is driven by imitating best practice we expect the coefficient on leader-distance to be positive, but not equal to the coefficient on laggard-distance. Such a result implies 1) that the laggards have more to gain from industry knowledge than do leaders, and 2) that the amount they gain increases with their distance from the leader.
The second empirical form, density-above, matches the spillover construct implicit in the endogenous growth models where firms randomly encounter rivals and the amount of knowledge they expropriate is a function of the rival's surfeit knowledge (Jovanovic and Rob 1989 , Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994 , Eeckhout and Jovanovic 2002 . Density-above is the sum of the differences in cost inefficiency between focal firm i and rival firm j for all firms more efficient than the focal firm. However, by its nature, density confounds two fundamentally separable constructs -average knowledge stock of competitors with higher efficiency and the number of such firms. The number of competitors above, n a , captures the likelihood of encountering a competitor with superior knowledge, while the average stock captures the expected amount of knowledge gained per encounter. To isolate the effects of competition from those of spillovers we decompose density into these two constituent elements. Accordingly, we capture the density-above spillover pool with two variables: (a) count-above the number of firms with lower costs than the focal firm, n a ; and (b) average-above the average difference in cost inefficiency between focal firm i and rival j for all firms more efficient than the focal firm:
6 Cost efficiency can be improved by many factors other than innovation. Rather than treat those factors here in a discussion of functional form, we deal with them later in the discussion of controls.
Saa i =(1/n a )Σ j ( c i -c j ) V c j < c i , and 0 otherwise (7)
A companion measure for the n b firms with higher costs than the focal firm, average-below is the sum of the cost distances for all firms whose cost is above the focal firm. and 0 otherwise (8) We are interested in testing the null hypothesis of non-directional (pooled) spillovers using the density measure, just as we were using the distance measure. While the distance test was principally one of directionality, the density test will be more compelling because it implicitly tests equation 2, the functional form for pooled spillovers. Under this form, the entire density of firm knowledge contributes to the spillover pool, Sp i . Since the entire spillover pool is the pool to the right of the focal firm plus that to the left, we can express pooled spillovers in terms of the average knowlege measures:
Thus to test the null hypothesis that spillovers are pooled, we compare the coefficients for average-above and average-below. We accept the null hypothesis if the coefficients for average-above and average-below are of equal magnitude.
As mentioned previously, equations 5 through 9 capture functional forms currently found in the innovation literature. Since our goal is facilitating consensus within the existing literature, this seems to be the right set of forms. However, we add a final form to show the potential payoff to reopening the functional form question entirely. Our final form is a simple rank ordering of firms in the industry, count above. While this measure is primarily used as a component of density above, it is potentially interesting in its own right. It preserves directionality (it increases with the number of superior rivals) but fails to capture the amount of rival knowledge.
Sca i = count (j) V c j < c i , and 0 otherwise
For consistency with the other functional forms, we include the mirror image, count below: and 0 otherwise (11) Note that the sum of count-above and the count-below equals the number for firms (minus the focal firm)
in the industry and thus is also a measure of competition.
Industry
We conduct our tests in the banking industry following de-regulation. The industry was chosen because it is fragmented with localized competition and has substantial innovation. Furthermore, because banking is regulated, we can obtain quarterly cost data for the full census of insured banks.
Fragmentation is important because it allows us to compare discrete markets within the same industry, where each market faces the same inverse demand function and shares the same technology.
Thus we can compare differences in spillover pools while controlling for other factors affecting cost improvement across distinct industries. We can also control for differences in level of demand through differences in economic conditions across markets.
Cost data. The FDIC collects extensive data on bank inputs and outputs for all banks in its insurance program (over 99% of all banks). We use the raw data on inputs and outputs to form a cost efficiency measure that is comparable across firms. The use of cost as the measure of knowledge and change in cost as the measure of innovation preserves the conventions in Spence (1984) , Nelson and Winter (1982) and Levin and Reiss (1984, 1988) , where the goal of innovation is to reduce cost. The measure is flexible in that it accommodates both process innovation (directly aimed at cost reduction) and product innovation (higher price premium for given cost). An additional advantage of a cost efficiency measure is that it is one-dimensional. Knowledge of all types gets collapsed into a cost equivalent.
Therefore we can feasibly define a knowledge (cost) frontier and have a meaningful reference for direction and distance to that frontier. Such a measure is less feasible for multi-product industries, or for industries comprising diversified firms with consolidated reporting.
There are two discrete definitions of market appropriate for banking: the state, representing certificate/headquarters-level competition, or the municipality, representing branch-level competition.
Following Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) our primary definition of a market is the state. However as a robustness check we replicate all tests using Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as the market definition.
Innovation and spillovers in banking
The intent of this section is three-fold. First, we wish to reinforce the idea that banking has a high level of innovation -thus an appropriate setting for a study of spillovers. Second, we want to argue that banking is particularly appropriate for the study of spillovers because at any time there is as a body of innovations at various stages of diffusion (spillover pool) as opposed to a single innovation that is innovated and then imitated. Finally, we want to identify (and ultimately control empirically) factors other than spillovers affecting firm innovation.
Level of innovation. Because banking is not a science-based industry, it doesn't come to mind when we list innovative industries. However, banking has had tremendous innovation and productivity The prevalence of diffusion studies stems from the natural-experiment quality of the data:
Diffusion of any one innovation allows researchers to control for its intrinsic quality, while examining how firm and market characteristics affect innovative behavior (where innovation is defined as adoption).
In contrast, studying invention would have to compare innovations of different qualities arising in different contexts from different firms. While focusing on diffusion can be viewed as a limitation, it covers a substantial share of banks' innovation decisions as well as their performance improvement (there are approximately 10,000 potential adoptions for each invention). In addition, the same basic model of firm profit maximization drives invention as well as adoption (with the exception that invention adds uncertainty as well as concerns with appropriability).
Studies of banking diffusion pertain primarily to three important innovations: ATMs, Small
Business Scoring Systems (SBSS), and transactional Web sites. There is little need to describe ATMs because they are ubiquitous. They were introduced by Chemical Bank in 1969, by 1979 they had been adopted by 12% of banks (Sharma 1992) , and as of 2000 were fully diffused throughout the industry.
SBSS is a scoring system for assessing the credit risk of commercial loans developed by Fair Isaac in 1993. This is the commercial equivalent of their FICO system for evaluating consumer credit. As of 2000, 7 All data in the paragraph are from the Nilson Report.
50% of large banks had adopted SBSS (Akhavein et al. 2005 The histories of ATMs, SBSS and Internet banking discussed above and captured in Figure 4 , together with the fact that these comprise only three of the 651 significant banking innovations, suggest an environment where numerous innovations are simultaneously being generated and adopted/diffused.
Thus in any given year there are innovations at each stage of a diffusion cycle and firms are making decisions as much (if not more) about what to adopt as whether to adopt. This is precisely the environment of diffuse innovative knowledge that spillovers seem to connote.
Other factors affecting innovation. To understand other factors affecting innovation we turn to empirical studies of these three major innovations. Studies by Hannan and McDowell (1984) and Sharma Taken together the results suggest the adoption process reflects profit maximization logic, and that there is greater heterogeneity within markets than across markets in the factors affecting profitability.
Nevertheless, since our empirical strategy is to attribute efficiency gains not otherwise accounted for to spillovers, we control for all these time-varying market and firm-level factors. In addition we employ an Arellano-Bond specification which inherently controls for permanent differences across firms (and by extension markets) through first differencing.
Trends in banking during the period
A number of industry changes occurred during the period we examine. We want to understand the extent to which these, rather than spillovers, are driving improvement in bank efficiency. -
The banks also responded to competition by adopting a client-based approach to banking. The client-based approach (in conjunction with legislative changes from the Glass Steagel Act allowing banks to underwrite securities) led banks into new areas (underwriting, derivatives, investment management, mutual funds, insurance, and annuities). The complementarities between the areas (the ability to cross-sell and leverage customer knowledge and monitoring from one area to another) yielded scope economies in relationship management. These scope economies provided additional rationale for acquisitions, since each acquired customer carried higher lifetime value.
The aforementioned motivations for merger ignore additional advantages ultimately realized by the large banks: risk reduction through geographic and product diversification, scale economies in operations, information technology, and ability to amortize marketing and R&D expenditures over broader output. Further, the ability to exploit innovation over a broader output increased the returns to innovation and accordingly increased the incentives to innovate.
Thus a number of things were occurring in banking during the period we examine. The picture we want to paint is that these forces created the stimulus for innovation. When these factors act as a stimulus they aren't really a competing explanation to spillovers. Rather they are a complement -firms need a means to respond to the stimulus. There are three means to innovate at the bank level. One fairly immediate mechanism for gaining rival knowledge is merger -the acquiring bank either obtains knowledge from the target and exploits it in the parent, or diffuses the parent's knowledge throughout the target, as in Bank One (HBS 9-394-043). While such direct transfers of knowledge are often treated as spillovers, we take the conservative view that purchasing knowledge is an interesting but distinct phenomenon from spillovers. Accordingly we control for these effects in stage 2 tests.
In summary, trends in the industry suggest that in addition to the market and firm controls identified in the diffusion studies, we add controls for competition, scale economies, and mergers.
Empirical Model
Analysis proceeds in two stages. In the first stage we model an industry cost frontier to collect measures of cost efficiency for each firm in each year. In the second stage, we model changes in a firm's efficiency (derived from stage 1) as a function of its spillover pool, where the spillover pool is alternatively defined as each of the three functional forms characterized in section 3.1.
Stage 1-Firm efficiency. 8 We follow convention in studies of bank efficiency by modeling a stochastic cost frontier using a translog cost function (Cebenoyan, Papaioannou, and Travlos 1992 , Hermalin and Wallace 1992 , Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey 1993 , Mester 1993 . Stochastic frontier analysis, developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) , is based on the econometric specification of a cost frontier. To date, more than 500 studies have employed the translog cost frontier to model banking efficiency (EconLit), the most recent being Amiti and Konings (2007) . The model assumes that the log of firm i's cost in year t, c it , differs from the cost frontier, c min , by an amount comprising two distinct components: a standard normally distributed error term e it , and a cost inefficiency term modeled as a nonnegative random variable u it -which we assume to take the form of a truncated normal distribution.
9
Potential problems with observations that are far from the sample means have led some researchers to adopt non-parametric approaches to frontier analysis (Wheelock and Wilson 2006) . The advantage of non-parametric approaches is that they don't impose a functional form on the distribution of the efficiency term. This arises from the fact that all error is ascribed to efficiency in non-parametric models. These recent non-parametric techniques solve the problem of outlier sensitivity through partial frontiers, but retain the problem of noise (Wheelock and Wilson 2006) . Unfortunately the work does not compare its estimates to those in prior studies, nor does it offer other approaches to validating the methodology. The main conclusion in Wheelock and Wilson (2006) is that large firms have the greatest efficiency improvement. This conclusion coincides with views expressed by Berger and Mester (2003) and Bernanke (2006) that technical change has favored large banks at the expense of smaller banks, but has not been demonstrated elsewhere.
Given broader acceptance for efficiency measures derived from the translog cost function and given the ability of those measures to explain phenomena related to bank inefficiency such as bank failure Humphrey 1992, Wheelock and Wilson 1995) and problem loans (Berger and DeYoung 1997), we continue to employ them here. We address attendant concerns regarding outliers in our second stage analysis.
One particularly nice feature of the translog cost function is its ability to accommodate the complex array of bank inputs and outputs. In addition, the translog form accommodates tradeoffs in both market strategies (product mixes and prices) and operational strategies (input mixes). 10 The basic translog cost function models a cost minimizing firm i in year t operating with (in log form) outputs y it and input prices w it : log observed firm cost 9 Other distributional assumptions are also possible, the most common of which are the half normal and exponential distributions. All results are robust to these alternative distributions. 10 Note that the translog model used in panel studies of the banking literature does not include a fixed effect. The objective of their studies, and ours, is to capture between firm differences in efficiency over time. The inclusion of a fixed effect would remove mean firm efficiency differences and thus only capture variation within firms over time.
We remove mean firm differences in the second stage of our analysis. We pool data for all firms over fourteen years using the model to capture firm-year measures of cost inefficiency relative to a global and permanent cost frontier. We collect the estimates of the expected value of firm-year cost inefficiency in stage 1, E(u it | e it ), which for convenience we continue to label as u it . We then use these estimates as the dependent variable in stage 2 to test the functional form of the spillover pool.
Stage 2-Test of spillover pool. We model innovation (improvement in firm cost efficiency) as a function of three specifications for the firm's spillover pool. Equation (13) In the above time series model innovation is captured as current period cost (on the left hand side) relative to cost in the prior periods (on the right hand side). This lagged dependent variable serves to capture the significant persistence in the data generating process -in that firm efficiency changes only slowly over time. 11 In addition to the persistence of the dependent variable, our key independent variables (spillover pools) are constructed from a lag of the dependent variable. As such, our model is inherently dynamic. The use of lagged dependent variables in a fixed-effects estimation leads to biased estimates (Nickell 1981) . In order to account for this, Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano-Bond estimator), which has since become a standard procedure in estimating dynamic models with panel data. The Arellano-Bond model controls for endogeneity by estimating a first difference model using lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments for the lagged difference. Because our spillover pool variables are derived from the cost variables, they too suffer from estimation concerns. We treat the spillover variables as endogenous (correlated with both current and prior period error terms). As such, we instrument the differences in the spillover variables with further lags of the levels of the spillover. Our primary model uses two lags of the dependent variable to capture the dynamics of the efficiency adjustment process, although the results are robust to a variety of alternative lag structures.
Data and Measures
The data for the study comes from the FDIC Research Database that contains quarterly financial data for all banks filing the "Report of Condition and Income" (Call Report). Upon entry into the market, each bank is allocated a unique certificate number by the FDIC -and we take the bank (certificate number) as our fundamental unit of analysis. The FDIC classifies and compiles data on two distinct types While there is considerable debate as to the choice of inputs and outputs in the banking sector, a review of the literature suggests some convergence around a model that sees capital and labor as inputs to the production process and various forms of loans as outputs (Wheelock and Wilson, 1995) . We collect data to construct seven variables related to banking efficiency in log thousands of constant 1996 dollars.
The dependent variable is total cost -total interest and non-interest expenses. The six independent variables are divided between input prices and output quantities. In order to test the hypotheses in the second stage model, we create year-specific spillover pools for each firm in accordance with equations 5 through 11. To test the leader distance spillover specification, we calculate leader-distance as the cost efficiency of the focal firm less that of the leader.
The laggard distance is calculated in an analogous manner.
To test the density above and below specification, we disaggregate density into its constituent parts -count of competitors and average knowledge stock of competitors. Count captures the likelihood of encountering a rival; average captures the expected value of knowledge from that rival. To disentangle pooled from asymmetric spillovers, we disaggregate count into count_above -the number of firms more efficient that the focal firm, and count_below -the number of less efficient firms. We also disaggregate average into average_above -the average difference in cost efficiency between the focal firm and each lower cost rival and average_below (calculated in an analogous manner).
We add to the spillover pool variables a number of firm-level and market-level controls. At the varying controls, Arellano-Bond estimation inherently controls for permanent characteristics of firms and markets via first differencing.
Results
Stage 1 -Firm Cost Efficiency. Table 1 provides variable descriptions and summary statistics of the data used in the Stage 1 stochastic frontier model. We specify a truncated normal distribution for the inefficiency term and a normally distributed error term. Estimation is conducted using maximum likelihood techniques. Results from the stage 1 analysis using equation 12 are given in Table 2 . The objective of the stage 1 analysis is to provide the firm-year cost inefficiencies for stage 2. While a discussion of the estimated coefficients for the frontier model is outside the scope of this paper, the coefficient estimates are consistent with expectations as: (a) total costs appear to rise with output and increases in the price of capital, and (b) firms substitute labor and physical capital in response to changing prices for these inputs.
The more important result of the stage 1 frontier estimation is the expected value of the inefficiency terms, u it . The distribution of the cost inefficiency is given in Figure 6a and the mean value over time is depicted in Figure 6b . Note that the inefficiency metric, u it , is by construction a log-based measure of the cost multiplier in a multiplicative form (unlogged) of equation 12. The mean u it over the entire period is 0.171, which indicates that the mean firm has a cost structure 18.6% above that of a firm on the cost frontier. The data also indicate that while the mean cost inefficiency changes over time in response to changing technologies and demand conditions, the general trend is toward increasing efficiency (decreasing cost), which is as expected.
-------------------------------
Insert Tables 1 and 2 
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While changes in cost efficiency are a standard measure of innovation in the banking literature, their use in other sectors is less common. In order to provide intuition for this measure, we compare its dynamics to productivity dynamics in other sectors. Our approach is to mimic longitudinal micro-data (LMD) studies and present a transition matrix of firm efficiency (Table 3 ). The transition matrix characterizes how a firm's efficiency in one period is related to its efficiency in the subsequent period.
The table decomposes firm efficiency into quintiles, then depicts year-to-year movements across quintiles by comparing rows and columns. As an example, take the row labeled 1. This represents the highest-performing (lowest cost inefficiency) firms in a given year. The table indicates that the majority of firms (78%) remain in the top (lowest cost) quintile in the subsequent year, 15% drop one quintile, 2% drop two quintiles, less than 1% drop to each of the bottom two quintiles, 2.7% merge with other firms, and 0.5% fail outright. Table 3 about here Table 4 provides variable descriptive statistics for the approximately 122,000 bank-year observations used in the Stage 2 analysis, and Table 5 provides the correlation table. Results for tests of spillover form (equation 13), estimated using our primary specification, are presented in Table 6 . We first review models with controls to show the effects of other factors affecting improvement in bank efficiency. We then turn to our main test. Tables 4, 5 and 6
Control variables
Looking first at the control variables in isolation in models 1 through 4, we note that these variables behave as one would anticipate. In model 1, we note that the lagged dependent variables were both significant. The first lag was positive and significant. The second lag was negative and significant, but an order of magnitude smaller than the first lag. We examined further lags of efficiency, but found them to be largely non-significant. This suggests that the adjustment period for shocks to efficiency is approximately two years. Also of note in this model are the tests for autocorrelation in first differenced error terms. For the moment conditions of Arellano-Bond estimation to be valid, second order autocorrelation must be non-significant. In our estimation models, while first order autocorrelation was significant (Table 6 presents z statistics), second order correlation was non-significant, suggesting the moment conditions hold. This remained true for all models in Tables 6-8. Model 2 adds the firm controls. Of the two size metrics, the number of branches was negative and significant (reflecting cost reduction), while assets were non-significant. The negative sign on branches suggests that innovation is increasing in the size of the bank. (The lack of significance for assets is largely expected as assets and branches are correlated at 0.79). The coefficient on holding company is significant above and beyond the number of branches. Both results match studies of innovation diffusion in banking discussed in section 3.3.1 (as well as innovation theory, where the returns to innovation are defined as unit margin increase times output scale). We included additional controls for holding company scale (number of banks, number of states, and number of branches); however, because these variables are correlated above 0.9, their coefficients should not be interpreted separately. Finally, market share was positive and significant suggesting that market power inhibits innovation. This result conflicts with conclusions from the diffusion studies that market concentration (reflecting market power) increases innovation.
Model 3 adds controls for market demand. Of the two measures for market size, population is positive and significant while industry size was negative but not significant. Since these variables are highly correlated, they are not separately interpretable. However, the joint effect of the two controls indicates innovation decreases with market size. This matches results from the diffusion studies discussed in section 3.3.1. Market growth, as captured by building permits, was negative and significant indicating that growth increases innovation (decreases cost) which matches Sharma (1992) and Hannan and McDowell (1984) results for adoption of ATM technology.
Model 4 adds controls for market supply. While the coefficients for the number of firms (count) and market concentration (Herfindahl) are both negative, neither is significant in this model (although both become marginally significant in later models). Of these two measures for competition, only concentration has been included in prior studies. Concentration has tended to increase innovation in those studies. This had been interpreted as evidence of the Schumpeterian market power hypothesis. The fact that market share decreases innovation in all our models tends to argue against that interpretation. The other obvious interpretation for the market concentration result is that lack of competition dulls the incentives to innovate. The fact that number of firms (often viewed as an inversed measure of concentration) also increases innovation suggests something more nuanced about the effects of competition. Of the remaining supply variables, only failure is significant. Failures decrease the efficiency of incumbents, possibly by reducing competitive pressure.
Main Test
Models 5 through 7 test the probability density form of spillovers. Recall that density has two components -count above, which captures the likelihood of encountering a more efficient rival, and average above, which captures the expected efficiency difference of those rivals. We test each variable separately, then test them jointly. In model 5, we disaggregate the number of firms into count_above and count_below. While both were negative and significant, the coefficient on count_below was an order of magnitude larger (more negative) than was the coefficient on count_above. A chi squared test rejects the equality of the coefficients (p<0.0001). This result suggests that the influence of the number of firms is asymmetric. Firms respond more to competition from laggards than from leaders.
An alternative interpretation of the result is that it is picking up effects from asymmetric spillovers (since count is one of the components of probability density). However, the result is inconsistent with an asymmetric spillover story (unless one believes that less efficient firms somehow offer more useful knowledge than more efficient firms). The most likely explanation for this result is that count not only captures the likelihood of encountering a rival, but also captures competition. From that perspective the results suggest firms respond more strongly to competition from less-efficient rivals than from more-efficient rivals.
Model 6 presents the results of the average_above and average_below elements of probability density using aggregate firm count rather than decomposed firm count. The coefficient on average_above is negative and significant. In contrast, the coefficient on average_below is positive and significantalthough an order of magnitude smaller than average_above. These results are consistent with expectations for asymmetric spillovers -the knowledge above is more valuable than the knowledge below.
Model 7 includes both elements of probability density -count and average -in the same model.
While average_above remained negative and significant, average_below became non-significant. Once again, a chi square test confirms that the coefficient on average_below is significantly smaller than that of average_above (p<0.0001). The coefficients on count-above and count-below are negative and significant as they were in model 5, but count-below remains significantly larger (factor of three) than count-above.
Thus again competition from below seems to provide greater stimulus to innovation than competition from above. In sum, models 5 through 7 provide significant evidence for asymmetric spillovers of a probability density form.
Model 7 also allows us to test the null hypothesis that the entire rival pool (pooled spillovers) drives innovation. We do this by comparing the coefficients on average_above and average_below. If the null hypothesis is correct, then the coefficients on average_above and average_below should be of equal magnitude. Tests that the two coefficients sum to zero were rejected at the 0.001 level in both models 6 and 7. Thus pooling all rival knowledge does not appear to be the correct functional form for spillovers.
We examined the marginal effects of the main variables in model 7. A one percent increase in average_above leads to a 0.06 percent decrease in cost. Of the significant control variables, only the marginal contribution of market share was larger (at 0.4 percent). Indeed, the marginal effect of average_above was 14 times larger than that of concentration, 15 times larger than that of holding_company ownership, and at least 32 times larger than the marginal effect of any of the entry and exit measures.
In model 8, we present the results of the leader_distance spillover specification. The coefficient on leader_distance was negative and significant, while the coefficient on laggard_distance was nonsignificant. A chi-squared test of the difference between leader_distance and laggard_distance was highly significant (p<0.0001), providing further evidence in support of asymmetric rather than pooled spillovers. The marginal effect of a one percent increase in leader distance was a 0.04 percent decrease in cost. Thus, the marginal contribution of leader_distance was similar to that of average_above.
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Stage 2 -Robustness Models. We conducted two broad sets of robustness analyses -first to alternative constructions of the data sample and second to alternative estimation models. With regard to the sample, we examined four alternative constructions (Table 7) . First, to reduce the potential effects of outlier markets, we dropped the three largest states (models 1 and 2). The results on average_above and average_below were largely unchanged. Average_above remained significant and negative, while average_below became non-significant. This continues to provide support for the asymmetric spillover hypothesis. Moreover a test that the two coefficients are equal was again rejected at the 0.001 level. Thus we continue to reject the null hypothesis that spillovers are pooled. Of note, however, is that with this sample construction, leader_distance became non-significant.
Second, to reduce the potential effects of outlier firms, in models 3 and 4 we dropped bank-year observations in the top and bottom 5 percent of the sample. The results were robust to this specification. Table 7 about here
A brief comment on the lagged dependent variables is in order. In models 7 and 8, the coefficient on the first lagged dependent variable is greater than one. This would imply a kind of Mathew effect in which disparities in efficiency grow over time because the efficiency of high-efficiency firms grows faster than that of low-efficiency firms. Note, however, leader distance is constructed as own efficiency less that of the leader (and the analogous construction for laggard distance). As such, the true lagged dependent variable efficiency in model 8 is 1.1390-0.3299=0.809.
Third, because patterns of entry and exit are non-random in the sense that low-efficiency firms are more likely to exit, and entrants are less likely to be high-efficiency firms in their early years, we drop state-years from the sample based if they exhibit high levels of churning (entry and exits). The mean level of churn in the industry over our sample period was 0.06. That is, 6 percent of the population enter or exit in a given year. In models 5 and 6, we drop from the sample all state-years in which churn exceeds 6%.
This reduces the sample size by approximately 40 percent. Average_above and average_below were both highly significant. Indeed, average_above nearly doubled in magnitude from the main estimation results.
Thus in more stable markets the effects of asymmetry are more pronounced. This continues to provide support for the asymmetric spillover hypothesis and further rejects the null hypothesis that spillovers are pooled. As in models 3 and 4, leader_distance is non-significant.
Fourth, we assumed in our main model that the market and accordingly the market characteristics and spillover variables were defined by state boundaries. In models 7 and 8, we reconstructed all market characteristics and spillover variables using Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as the definition of market. The results for the probability density hypothesis are maintained. Average_above is negative and significant, while average_below is positive and significant. Thus we continue to find support for asymmetric spillovers and continue to reject the null hypothesis that spillovers are pooled.
Leader_distance again failed to hold -which further calls into question this spillover specification.
Our final set of robustness checks examines alternative specifications to equation 13 (Table 8 ). In models 1 and 2 we replace Arellano-Bond with a simple bank fixed effect specification. The results were robust to this alternative model specification. The coefficients for average_above, average_below, and leader_distance are of the same sign and level of significance as in the main specification. In models 3
and 4 we test a weighted fixed effect specification with weighting by the number of banking certificates in the state. Once again, the coefficients on average_above, average_below, and leader_distance are significant and of the same sign as in the main specification.
- Table 8 about here
In sum, the robustness analyses provide significant additional support for the asymmetry of spillovers. While the leader_distance result seemed sensitive to sample specification, the coefficient estimates on average_above and below were remarkably robust. In all specifications, average_above was negative and significant, and always significantly larger than average_below. Thus across all tests our results reject the null hypothesis that spillovers are pooled in favor of a hypothesis that they are asymmetric and conform to a probability density functional form.
Discussion
While spillovers are a crucial factor in determining the optimal environment for innovation and growth, there is no consensus regarding their impact on firms' innovative behavior. One reason for this may be that models differ in their assumptions about the functional form of the spillover pool. Thus knowing the correct functional form may facilitate consensus-either analytically (by modifying models' assumptions) or empirically (by facilitating a critical test of competing theories).
Accordingly, we characterized and tested alternative specifications for the spillover pool in the banking industry. We chose that industry 1) because it has one of the highest innovation and growth rates in the economy and 2) it comprises fifty markets that share a common demand curve and underlying technology. Thus we could exploit variance in spillover pools while controlling implicitly for technology and explicitly for market factors affecting incentives to innovate. This is not possible for industries with a single market (most of the manufacturing industries engaged in R&D).
Our results in that setting indicate that knowledge does appear to have directionality. The rate at which firms increase their efficiency is related to the amount of knowledge held by more efficient firms rather than the amount held by the entire set of firms. A test of the null hypothesis that spillovers are pooled is rejected in all models.
In addition to the main model we conducted an extensive set of robustness checks including four alternative sample constructions and two alternative model specifications for the main test. The significant results for the probability density form of asymmetric spillovers are robust to all these checks, as is rejection of the null hypothesis that spillovers are pooled.
One interesting result from the robustness checks is that the leader-distance form of spillover pools is sensitive to sample construction. Thus it appears firms benefit from the set of knowledge held by more efficient firms rather than their distance to the leader. This contrast is important for four reasons.
First, it means the role of spillovers is more nuanced than merely imitating best practice. Second, it means that our spillover variables are not merely picking up an "opportunity to improve" effect (firms are not merely improving based on how far they have to go). Third, the results suggest a model where firms are scanning the set of more efficient firms and synthesizing what they learn with what they know/do internally. Finally, this result together with the result that the number of superior firms has a negative effect on innovation suggests that the underlying mechanism for spillovers is unlikely to be one of randomly encountering a rival.
While our main interest was testing the functional form of spillovers, our efforts to isolate the effects of spillovers allow us to say something about other factors affecting innovation. The most notable results pertain to competition. In a model without spillovers neither market concentration nor number of firms is significant. When we introduce asymmetric spillover pools the competition variables become marginally significant. Thus competition seems to interact with spillovers. Competition creates an incentive to innovate, while spillovers provide a means.
Our most interesting result regarding competition emerged when we decomposed the density form of spillovers into its constituent elements (number of firms and knowledge per firm). We did this precisely to isolate all potential effects of competition from our spillover measures. Because we were looking at spillovers asymmetrically (treating firms above and below separately), we were able to examine asymmetric effects of competition as well. Here we found that firms respond more to competition from less-efficicient rivals than they do from more-efficient rivals. This result fits with the intuition in "escape competition" stimulus for innovation, where firms innovate to restore lost profits associated with laggards who have imitated them (Aghion et al 2001) .
We wish to offer some caveats for the results. Our explanation for differential innovation rates between leaders and laggards is that the cost to innovate for laggards is lower due to their ability to freeride on leader innovation. An alternative explanation relies on aspiration theory. In this view, laggard firms are more likely to innovate because their lower profits give them greater incentive to do so (Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern 2000) . The puzzle with the aspiration explanation is that the firms with the greatest incentive to innovate are by definition the ones with the least resources to do so. Thus asymmetric spillovers is not an alternative to aspiration theory, it is the means (higher level of free inputs)
by which aspirations can be realized (Acs, Audretsch, and Feldman 1994) .
A second caveat is that our test was conducted in a single setting -banking. What is appealing about this setting is that market structure is not endogenously determined by technology (at least not entirely). Accordingly it inherently controls for many unobserved factors that plague cross-industry tests of innovative productivity. Despite the advantage, there are things unique to banking that may limit our ability to extend results to other settings. First, this is a setting where patents don't appear to be very important. The major innovations discussed in the paper (ATM, SBSS, and internet transactions) all diffuse rapidly. Accordingly this is not a setting where profits are driven by patent-protected monopolies for new products. Since patents offer temporary monopolies on inventions in exchange for full disclosure of the knowledge underlying the invention, it is likely that spillovers behave quite differently in industries where patenting is important, e.g., pharmaceuticals and semi-conductors.
A third caveat is that banking is an extremely dense industry -on average 10,000 banks with 60,000 branches over our sample period. Spillover patterns may differ in industries serving national or global markets, e.g., autos, communications, and petroleum.
Fourth, this is a setting where we don't observe R&D expenditures, so we can't say anything concrete about the link between spillovers and own R&D. Our implicit assumption in the empirics is that R&D expenditures increase monotonically with firm size (matching the stylized fact in Cohen and Levin 1989 Second, for the empirical anomaly of higher returns to spillovers than to focal firm R&D, the results here imply that the anomaly is an artifact of specification error-pooling spillovers when their correct functional form is asymmetric. Estimates of spillover elasticity using asymmetric spillovers indicate values that are closer to expectations, i.e., less than or equal to the productivity of own R&D (Knott and Posen 2008) .
Finally, asymmetric spillovers offer a simple solution to the firm size and R&D puzzle-the empirical regularity that large firms spend proportionately more on R&D, but that small firms have higher R&D productivity. Asymmetric spillovers imply that small firms (those most likely to be laggards) derive greater benefits from rival R&D than do large firms. Given that inputs from own R&D and spillovers both contribute to innovative outcomes, estimates of R&D productivity that consider only own R&D input (or equivalently consider own R&D plus a common spillover pool) will exhibit artificially high estimates of R&D productivity for small firms.
14 Results available from the authors. ρ ρ = , then it would be captured in firm fixed effects. In either of these two cases, the use of the total spillover pool T S rather than the actual pool U S would have no effect on the outcome of the estimation. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the amount of spillovers accessible to a firm and redundant with the firm's existing knowledge, changes over time. If so, estimates will be biased. 15 Note this definition of Y suffers from the conventional criticisms that in many industries the output only reflects the appropriable portion of R&D and does not reflect quality improvements. Accordingly estimates will understate the true value of R&D (Griliches 1979 2.078e+00*** (2.429E-02) w2w3 -2.519e-02*** (1.612E-03) y1
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